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COMPETING VISIONS OF APPELLATE JUSTICE FOR 
INDIAN COUNTRY: A UNITED STATES COURT OF INDIAN 
APPEALS OR AN AMERICAN INDIAN SUPREME COURT 
Eugene R. Fidell* 
Introduction 
In 2013 I proposed the establishment by federally recognized tribes of an 
opt-in American Indian Supreme Court that would review decisions of 
tribal courts.1 After that article went to press, the congressionally created2 
Indian Law and Order Commission (ILOC)3 released an important report, A 
Roadmap for Making Native America Safer.4 Because the ILOC Roadmap 
offers a markedly different suggestion for a new court, a postscript to my 
article seems in order. I have also had a few further thoughts unrelated to 
the Roadmap that may shed additional light on aspects of the American 
Indian Supreme Court proposal. Part I of this article will comment on the 
court suggested by ILOC, referred to here as the Roadmap Circuit. Parts II 
and III will elaborate on the potential scope of federal question jurisdiction 
that an American Indian Supreme Court, which would be fundamentally 
different from the Roadmap Circuit, might enjoy, and the permissibility and 
political feasibility of subjecting an American Indian Supreme Court’s 
decisions on federal questions to review by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 * Senior Research Scholar in Law and Florence Rogatz Visiting Lecturer in Law, 
Yale Law School. 
 1. Eugene R. Fidell, An American Indian Supreme Court, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 1, 13-14 
(2013), http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Documents/ailj/Fall%202013/Fidell-Final.pdf. 
 2. 25 U.S.C. § 2812 (2012); Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 
235, 124 Stat. 2258, 2282-86; Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. 
L. No. 113-4, § 909(a), 127 Stat. 54, 126. 
 3. Indian Law and Order Commission, UCLA AM. INDIAN STUDIES CTR., http://www. 
aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). 
 4. See generally INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE 
AMERICA SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT & CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_America_Safer-
Full.pdf [hereinafter ROADMAP]. 
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I. The Proposed Roadmap Circuit 
The ILOC commissioners made the following dramatic 
recommendations, among others: 
1.1: Congress should clarify that any Tribe that so chooses can 
opt out immediately, fully or partially, of Federal Indian country 
criminal jurisdiction and/or congressionally authorized State 
jurisdiction, except for Federal laws of general application. 
Upon a Tribe’s exercise of opting out, Congress would 
immediately recognize the Tribe’s inherent criminal jurisdiction 
over all persons within the exterior boundaries of the Tribe’s 
lands as defined in the Federal Indian Country Act. This 
recognition, however, would be based on the understanding that 
the Tribal government must also immediately afford all 
individuals charged with a crime with civil rights protections 
equivalent to those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, subject 
to full Federal judicial appellate review as described below, 
following exhaustion of Tribal remedies, in addition to the 
continued availability of Federal habeas corpus remedies. 
1.2: To implement Tribes’ opt-out authority, Congress should 
establish a new Federal circuit court, the United States Court of 
Indian Appeals. This would be a full Federal appellate court as 
authorized by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, on par with 
any of the existing circuits, to hear all appeals relating to 
alleged violations of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th Amendments of the 
U.S. Constitution by Tribal courts; to interpret Federal law 
related to criminal cases arising in Indian country throughout 
the United States; to hear and resolve Federal questions 
involving the jurisdiction of Tribal courts; and to address 
Federal habeas corpus petitions. Specialized circuit courts, such 
as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which 
hears matters involving intellectual property rights protection, 
have proven to be cost effective and provide a successful 
precedent for the approach that the Commission recommends. A 
U.S. Court of Indian Appeals is needed because it would 
establish a more consistent, uniform, and predictable body of 
case law dealing with civil rights issues and matters of Federal 
law interpretation arising in Indian country. Before appealing to 
this new circuit court, all defendants would first be required to 
exhaust remedies in Tribal courts pursuant to the current 
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No. 2] COMPETING VISIONS OF APPELLATE JUSTICE 235 
 
 
Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, which would be 
amended to apply to Tribal court proceedings so as to ensure 
that defendants’ Federal constitutional rights are fully protected. 
Appeals from the U.S. Court of Indian Appeals would lie with 
the United States Supreme Court according to the current 
discretionary review process.  
 . . . . 
1.3: The Commission stresses that an Indian nation’s sovereign 
choice to opt out of current jurisdictional arrangements should 
and must not preclude a later choice to return to partial or full 
Federal or State criminal jurisdiction. The legislation 
implementing the opt-out provisions must, therefore, contain a 
reciprocal right to opt back in if a Tribe so chooses.5 
The full report explained: 
 The mirror of this special circuit court jurisdiction at the 
Tribal court level is this: Tribal courts do not become Federal 
courts for general purposes. Tribes retain full and final authority 
over the definition of the crime, sentencing options, and the 
appropriate substance and process for appeals outside of the 
narrow jurisdiction reserved for the new Federal circuit court. 
 It has been argued that the government-to-government 
relationships between Tribes and the U.S. government mean that 
the U.S. Supreme Court is the appropriate initial forum for any 
appeal of a Tribal court decision. While this may be true in 
concept, the Commission also seeks to ensure that Tribal court 
operations continue in the smoothest manner possible and that 
appeals are minimally disruptive to the ongoing delivery of 
justice services in Tribal communities. 
 With 566[6] federally recognized tribes in the United States, 
the U.S. Supreme Court might be asked to hear many appeals 
from Indian country, but choose only a few to remain responsive 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. at 23-25. 
 6. The number has since risen to 567, with the addition of the Pamunkey Indian Tribe. 
See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of the Pamunkey Indian Tribe, 80 
Fed. Reg. 39,144 (July 8, 2015). The current list appears at Indian Entities Recognized and 
Eligible to Receive Services from the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 26,826 
(May 4, 2016). 
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to the wide array other issues and subject matters brought to its 
attention. Tribal courts could become paralyzed by the wait and 
by the loss of confidence generated by the cloud of uncertainty 
resulting from dozens of denied appeals. Having a panel of 
Article III judges—all with the highest expertise in Indian law, 
ruling in a forum designed in consultation between the U.S. 
government and Tribal governments—hear such cases first 
meets not only the demands of practicality, but also reinforces 
Tribal sovereignty.7 
There is much to be said for the ILOC proposal to allow tribes to opt out 
of federal and state criminal jurisdiction and resume criminal jurisdiction 
over all persons who are present within the tribe’s lands. This would 
fundamentally alter the legal environment within which tribes currently 
function. But under the proposal, the shift would come at a potentially 
heavy price if it required tribal compliance with the full panoply of 
protections granted by the United States Constitution.8 From that 
perspective, therefore, the change—which reflects what ILOC 
commissioners have referred to as a “grand bargain”—could instead prove 
to be a Faustian bargain. Presented with the choice, some—perhaps most—
tribes would quite likely conclude that the trade-off entailed, on balance, an 
unacceptable compromise of tribal sovereignty. Significantly, although the 
National American Indian Court Judges Association adopted a resolution 
supporting the ILOC report, it recommended that tribal courts be required 
to comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act rather than the Bill of Rights.9 
                                                                                                                 
 7. ROADMAP, supra note 4, at 24 (footnote omitted). 
 8. This assumes that where the drafters referred to equivalent rights they meant 
identical rights. If equivalence means something other than mirror-image, then a huge 
ambiguity will loom over the entire project. At present, the received learning is that a tribe’s 
application of the protections afforded by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 
(2012) (“ICRA”), need not literally replicate the Bill of Rights jurisprudence applicable to 
federal and state governments. For example, “[t]he right to counsel under ICRA is not 
coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right.” United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 
1962 (2016); see generally MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 349-
51 (2011) [hereinafter FLETCHER, TRIBAL LAW]. Indeed, not every provision of the Bill of 
Rights is incorporated even generally in ICRA. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW § 6.4, at 247-48, 251 (2016). 
 9. Nat’l Am. Indian Ct. Judges Ass’n, Res. No. 2015-01 (Oct. 24, 2015), 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/resolution-2015-01.pdf. The Coalition of Bar 
Associations of Color also supported the ILOC recommendations, but without the qualification 
about applying ICRA protections. Coalition of Bar Ass’ns of Color, Resolution Supporting 
Implementation of the Indian Law and Order Commission Recommendations (Mar. 2, 2015), 
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Such a change could make ILOC’s proposal far more palatable from a tribal 
perspective, although it would also likely stir up opposition from Congress 
and some states. 
The Roadmap proposes creation of a new federal circuit as a means of 
implementing the ILOC opt-out recommendation. The claim is that such a 
court would provide a uniform rule of decision rather than having divergent 
outcomes with respect to the application of constitutional protections 
depending on which existing geographical circuit contained the particular 
tribe's Indian country.  
Several aspects of the ILOC proposal give pause. Among these is the fact 
that it seems to go far beyond merely filling in the gap that would be 
created once federal and state law are ousted from Indian country. 
Ironically, the proposal seems to expose to federal review a broad range of 
tribal court decisions that are not currently subject to such review. At 
present, the role of the federal courts is confined to providing habeas review 
for detention in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act10 and assessing 
whether a tribe has acted within its jurisdiction in dealing with a 
nonmember.11 
The Roadmap Circuit would have far broader jurisdiction, and, except 
for appellate review of district court habeas decisions under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act (which would remain as is), would seemingly entail direct 
appellate review of tribal court decisions without requiring litigants to start 
at the district court level. That direct review would obviously impose on 
tribal courts a heightened requirement for full development of a record in 
non-habeas cases, since there would no longer be a district court that could 
                                                                                                                 
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.napaba.org/resource/resmgr/CBAC/2015-17CBAC.pdf. At its 
2015 Midyear Meeting in Houston, the American Bar Association House of Delegates 
endorsed all of the ILOC recommendations except for “the new circuit court provision of 
Recommendation 1.2.” ABA House of Delegates, Res. 111A (Rev.) (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2015mm_hodres/111a.pdf. As 
proposed by the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, the Criminal Justice Section, 
and the National Native American Bar Association, the resolution had not included such an 
exception. The revised resolution also “urge[d] Congress to establish a means of creating a 
consistent, uniform, and predictable body of case law dealing with the civil rights issues and 
matters of Federal law interpretation arising in Indian country . . . .” Id. 
 10. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69-70 (1978). 
 11. E.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987). Tribal court jurisdiction 
over nonmembers appears much more fragile than it should, as witness the affirmance by an 
equally divided Court in Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. 
Ct. 2159 (2016) (civil action for sexual assault of a tribal member in a store located on tribal 
land). 
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be counted on to perform that function. There are negatives to this in terms 
of time and expense but there is also a significant positive good in the sense 
that the more complete the record generated in the tribal court is, the less 
likely the reviewing court is to interfere with the substance of the tribal 
court’s decision. 
The Roadmap Circuit would review tribal court non-habeas proceedings 
in much the same way that a geographical circuit might review federal 
agency actions under the Administrative Orders Review Act (also known as 
the Hobbs Act)12 or other federal legislation that provides for direct review 
in the courts of appeals.13 
ILOC’s favorable reference to the performance of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in patent cases is one with which 
many observers would disagree. Indeed, the Supreme Court has had to 
intervene more often than one would have expected in that arcane area.14 
But whatever the case with respect to that admittedly arcane field, there is 
nothing specialized about habeas law or the application of the guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights once the decision has been made (as the ILOC proposal 
seemingly does) that those protections will be available in the same manner 
and to the same extent as they are outside Indian country. In other words, 
there is a tension baked into the Roadmap Circuit proposal: a case decided 
by the new court would be indistinguishable, doctrinally, from one decided 
by, say, the Ninth Circuit. Of course, if the touchstone becomes not the Bill 
of Rights but, as the National American Indian Court Judges Association 
recommended,15 the Indian Civil Rights Act, the case for a Roadmap 
Circuit would be stronger to the extent that doctrine may not perfectly 
replicate the Bill of Rights and there are likely to be tribe-specific 
variations. 
Additionally, the ILOC proposal would require exhaustion of tribal 
remedies in habeas cases. A tribal court defendant who is incarcerated on 
the basis of a proceeding that violates the Indian Civil Rights Act must 
invoke tribal trial and appellate court remedies before proceeding to federal 
district court for a writ of habeas corpus.16 To be sure, requiring exhaustion 
where tribal court jurisdiction is disputed is a way of respecting the dignity 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 2343 (2012). 
 13. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012). 
 14. See generally John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A 
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657 
(2009). 
 15. See Nat’l Am. Indian Ct. Judges Ass’n, supra note 9. 
 16. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012); e.g., Alvarez v. Tracy, 773 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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of tribal legal institutions (and therefore of tribes), but habeas is supposed 
to be a speedy remedy17 and demanding one or two tribal courthouse stops 
before a tribal prisoner can seek review by the Article III judges of the 
Roadmap Circuit could significantly retard a process that is intended to lead 
to prompt release from arbitrary detention.18 
At present, federal courts may police tribal compliance with the Indian 
Civil Rights Act only by writ of habeas corpus.19 Thus, if a person is not in 
custody, the sole and final remedy will be in tribal court. It seems from 
paragraph 1.2 of ILOC’s description that the commission intends that any 
violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments could be 
reviewed by the Roadmap Circuit.20 If so, and if the limitation announced 
in Martinez were abandoned, the result would be to expose a broad new 
swath of tribal court decisions to federal court review. Or perhaps those 
critical bodies of federal constitutional law will be applicable (and hence 
subject to district court and Roadmap Circuit review) only if they lead to 
incarceration. If so, adoption of the ILOC proposal will arguably discourage 
tribal courts from imposing jail sentences (even where merited) and resort 
instead to fines and other noncustodial punishments such as property 
forfeiture or banishment as ways to avoid federal intrusion on the 
administration of justice by tribal courts. 
If the Roadmap Circuit proposal’s exhaustion component can be viewed 
as vindicating tribal dignity interests, there is also a sense in which 
precisely the opposite is true. What’s wrong with creating a Roadmap 
Circuit that would review both tribal habeas cases from the district courts 
and tribal court decisions in non-habeas cases, subject to discretionary 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Absent a contrary order enlarging the response time for good cause shown, federal 
habeas petitions must be answered by the custodian within three days. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 
(2012).  
 18. Roadmap Recommendation 1.2’s reference to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
3161 (2012), is difficult to explain. It deals with ensuring speedy trial in criminal cases in the 
federal district courts, rather than with access to habeas corpus. Subjecting tribal courts to 
this statute would be a giant and widely unwelcome step in the direction of submerging 
tribal justice in the federal judicial system. In addition, ILOC’s narrative explanation refers 
to exhaustion of tribal remedies not only in the context of the constitutional right to a speedy 
trial, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, but also to a host of other rights conferred by the Bill of 
Rights, including Sixth Amendment rights other than the right to a speedy trial, such as 
public trial, venue, confrontation, compulsory process, and effective assistance of counsel. 
See ROADMAP, supra note 4, at 24-25. 
 19. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).  
 20. See ROADMAP, supra note 4, at 23-24. 
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review for either category of cases by the Supreme Court of the United 
States? 
One problem is that this architecture, by requiring the involvement of an 
intermediate federal court, would treat tribes as second-class entities. 
Congress has provided that decisions of the highest courts of the states, 
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia on federal questions are 
reviewable directly by the Supreme Court, rather than after an intermediate 
stop at the pertinent geographical circuit.21 Requiring tribal cases to make 
such a stop would signal that tribes do not possess the same dignitary 
interests as states.22 This is rubbing salt in the wound inflicted by the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia23 that tribes do not 
qualify as foreign states within the meaning of Article III’s grant of original 
jurisdiction to the Court.24 Tribes, it is said, are “domestic dependent 
nations,”25 whereas the states' consent was needed to bring the Constitution 
of 1787 into being.26 True enough, but is it a posture that symbolically or 
otherwise serves tribal interests? To interpose a specialized federal court 
between tribes and the Supreme Court is reminiscent of the arrangement 
under which, until 1970, decisions of the local courts of the District of 
Columbia were subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit.27 Treatment as foreign nations may be a 
bridge too far given Cherokee Nation, but would tribes really wish to be 
treated as if they were mere territories, as the Roadmap seems to propose? 
Uniformity, consistency and predictability—interests the ILOC proposal 
seeks to vindicate—are highly laudable objectives. But the Roadmap 
Circuit proposal does not fill those needs because, lacking jurisdiction over 
non-tribal cases, the new court could not compel uniformity on the part of 
any district court or geographical circuit in cases presenting the same 
constitutional issues outside the tribal context. Ensuring uniformity and 
resolving circuit splits would thus be the task of the Supreme Court. To the 
extent that the geographical circuits at times diverge on questions of federal 
                                                                                                                 
 21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257-1258 (2012). 
 22. Cf. Fidell, supra note 1, at 25-26. 
 23. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).  
 24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
 25. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. VII (requiring ratification by nine state conventions). 
 27. The D.C. Circuit’s role survived until Congress passed the District of Columbia 
Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473; see also, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 
1424-3 (2012) (reviewing decisions of appellate division of territorial district court). 
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Indian law (e.g., who is an Indian?),28 the splits are unfortunate but far from 
beyond the ability of the current federal appellate system to remedy, either 
through Supreme Court review on certiorari or by judicious exercise of the 
geographical circuits’ power to subject a case to hearing or rehearing en 
banc. 
Recommendation 1.2 would confer on the Roadmap Circuit jurisdiction 
over “criminal cases arising in Indian country.”29 Taken literally, this would 
mean that the new court would hear appeals from cases involving garden 
variety federal crimes of general application, such as drug offenses. The 
result would be that there might be one rule for federal drug offenses 
committed on a reservation and another, articulated by the geographical 
circuit, for the identical offense committed just outside. This ill serves the 
interest in uniformity. 
That the current architecture is imperfect could not be clearer. Yet the 
Roadmap Circuit proposal raises a host of issues. Above all, by creating a 
new federal court for Indian matters, it would draw tribal legal institutions 
ever more tightly into the federal embrace, which would defeat the central 
purpose of the proposed reform. That is reason enough to look elsewhere 
for reform of the structure for Indian cases. It need only be added that the 
very premise for the proposal—abandonment of the current basic 
arrangements that subject Indian country to federal and in some places state 
criminal jurisdiction—is difficult to imagine from a political perspective. 
The ILOC proposal will be a hard sell with Congress. The political 
impediments are so daunting that it is superfluous to point out other factors 
that would be difficult to sort out even if Congress were to turn back the 
hands of the clock to a nineteenth century model of tribal jurisdiction:30 the 
politics of selection and confirmation of judges to a Roadmap Circuit would 
be extraordinary. Because the proposal calls for an Article III court, 
confirmation hearings would fall to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
rather than the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.31 Could a case be made 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See, e.g., Brian L. Lewis, Do You Know What You Are? You Are What You Is; You 
Is What You Am: Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and the 
Current Split in the Courts of Appeals, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 241 (2010); 
United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 29. ROADMAP, supra note 4, at 23-4. 
 30. The ILOC proposal seems to restore the state of affairs after Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), and Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), but before the 
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012), United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 
(1881), and Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). 
 31. Standing Rules of the Senate, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 25-26 (2013) (Rule XXV(m) – 
Standing Committees). 
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for a kind of Indian preference for the new court? To be sure, the country 
broadly views diversity on the federal bench as highly desirable, but even a 
gentleman’s agreement, much less an explicit provision of law,32 to require 
that some or all of the seats on a new federal court be held by Indians would 
be problematic. It might work out that way, at least in part, but it is not hard 
to imagine how complicated the politics of nomination and confirmation 
might become, potentially leading to divisiveness and hard feelings where 
precisely the opposite ought to be the goal. Not that judicial selection 
politics would be simple with the American Indian Supreme Court I have 
proposed,33 but at least such a system would involve Indian politics decided 
by tribes and not “inside-the-Beltway” politics, rife with such familiar evils 
as hidden “holds” or trade-offs on issues entirely unrelated to the merits of 
a particular nominee. 
II. The Potential Scope of the Federal Question Jurisdiction of an American 
Indian Supreme Court 
To its framers, a main virtue of the ILOC proposal is the superimposition 
of a federal court. There are two reasons why the imposition of such a court 
might actually be a vice. First, it would come at an exorbitant symbolic 
price. Second, it would implicitly see federal law as the main event and as 
most deserving of legislative restructuring, whereas it is the growing 
number of tribal courts that should be looked to as the focus and engine of 
legal development in Indian country. Those courts can be expected to 
continue to grow over time, both in number and activity level. The 
challenge is to harness their energy in ways that maximize tribal influence. 
An American Indian Supreme Court would be more likely to foster tribal 
court development than a court that remained inherently an institution of 
the dominant society. Moreover, as an Article III court, the Roadmap 
Circuit would inevitably be subject to the shifting tides of the highly 
charged and largely opportunistic national debate over (depending on one’s 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(3) (2012) (political balance requirement for U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces); Eugene R. Fidell, The Next Judge, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & 
POL’Y 303, 308 (2011) (describing balance requirement as “indefensible”). The Obama 
administration proposed repeal of this provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 
2015. ILOC’s intent is that judges of the Roadmap Circuit would be nominated by the 
President “in consultation with tribes.” Testimony of Troy A. Eid and Affie Ellis on “A 
Roadmap for Making Native America Safer” Before the Sen. Comm. on Indian Affairs (Feb. 
12, 2014), http://www.indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/upload/files/021214Troy%20 
Eid%20Affie%20Ellis%20SCIA%20Testimony.docx. 
 33. See Fidell, supra note 1, at 30-31. 
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politics) judicial activism and judicial restraint. Perhaps those tides might 
wash over an American Indian Supreme Court as well. In a new court, a 
measure of activism is to be expected, although whether and to what extent 
that would be true of an American Indian Supreme Court would necessarily 
be a function of who was named to it and what constraints were imposed by 
the governing document. 
My 2013 article, An American Indian Supreme Court, attempted to 
identify categories of tribal court litigation that might lend themselves to 
review by an opt-in nationwide court.34 The ILOC proposal prompts a few 
additional observations on this important aspect of the matter. 
Federal questions can arise in a variety of ways in tribal court. The most 
fertile source of such questions is the ICRA, which applies to all federally 
acknowledged tribes.35 Even though the Supreme Court held in Martinez 
that that legislation did not give rise to implied rights of action justiciable in 
district court, that ought not to preclude tribal courts from enforcing its 
provisions in non-habeas contexts. Martinez should not be read as limiting 
tribal court jurisdiction because doing so would utterly frustrate 
congressional policy, which—in the years since 1968—is to foster self-
determination and the development and empowerment of tribal 
institutions.36 
Several other Acts of Congress are explicit bases for tribal court 
adjudication. These include, in part, the Indian Child Welfare Act,37 as well 
as a provision related to mortgage foreclosure actions instituted by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development,38 both of which were 
mentioned in Nevada v. Hicks.39 On the other hand, Hicks held that tribal 
courts lack jurisdiction over Section 198340 civil rights claims.41 The stated 
basis for this holding was that tribal courts, like most state courts (but 
unlike federal courts),42 are courts of general jurisdiction.43 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 26. 
 35. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(1) (2012). 
 36. E.g., Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act,  
Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.) 
 37. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012). 
 38. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-13(g)(5) (2012). 
 39. 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 41. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 369. 
 42. E.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 
 43. See B.J. Jones, The Independence of Tribal Justice Systems and the Separation of 
Powers 3 (n.d.), http://law.und.edu/tji/_files/docs/bjones-jud-indep-memo.pdf (citing Satiacum 
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Other federal causes of action that might find their way into tribal court 
and hence could come before an American Indian Supreme Court include 
those predicated on a treaty, such as the controversies over the Cherokee 
and Seminole Freedmen,44 or judge-made federal Indian law, of which 
there is no shortage.45 In addition, federal causes of action can be created by 
federal common law.46 
The classic rule for federal question cases47 is that of the well-pleaded 
complaint: the federal claim must be a part of the plaintiff’s affirmative 
case as opposed to merely forming the basis for a defense.48 No such rule 
would have to apply in tribal court, and hence such a court might adjudicate 
a federal question that arose only as a matter of defense. There would 
correspondingly be no reason to object to a system under which such a case 
could in time come before the proposed American Indian Supreme Court, 
and from there to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
                                                                                                                 
v. Sterud, 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6013, 6014 (Puy. Tr. Ct. 1982)); see, e.g., CITIZEN POTAWATOMI 
NATION CONST. art. 11, § 2, http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/potawatomi/potawatconst.html 
(last modified Apr. 21, 1998). Some tribes explicitly describe their courts as courts of limited 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE § 1 (“The Blackfeet Tribal 
Court is a court of ‘limited jurisdiction’.”), http://indianlaw.mt.gov/content/blackfeet/codes/ 
1999/chapter01.pdf; cf. Kimsey v. Reibach, 6 Am. Tribal L. Rptr. 119, 124 (Grand Ronde 
Tribal Ct. 2005) (disclaiming subject matter jurisdiction over defamation actions absent tribal 
legislation recognizing cause of action). 
 44. See e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Nash, No. 1:13-CV-01313, (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 28, 
2013) (Cherokee Freedmen) (pending). A treaty can also generate intertribal disputes. See 
e.g., Tulalip Tribes v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 794 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2015) (determination 
of “usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations,” as between tribes, under Treaty of 
Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (1855)); United States v. Washington, No. C70-9213RSM, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93516 (W.D. Wash. July 17, 2015) (Subproceeding No. 11-2); United 
States v. Washington, No. C70-9213, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176969 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 
2015) (Subproceeding No. 09-01). 
 45. See e.g., Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853 
(1985) (tribal court jurisdiction presents § 1331 federal question). For a current example of 
an intertribal dispute that arose from alleged violations of federal statutes see Caddo Nation 
of Oklahoma v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, Civil No. 16-559-W (W.D. Okla.) (pending) 
(protection of ancestral remains and funerary objects; invoking National Historic 
Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 916 (1966) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 54 U.S.C.) and National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370e (2012)). 
 46. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91 (1972); RICHARD H. FALLON, 
JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 783-84 (6th ed. 2009). 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 48. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 154 (1908). 
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III. Supreme Court Review of Decisions of an American Indian Supreme 
Court on Federal Questions 
In 2013 it seemed that there could be no substantial objection to 
extending the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United 
States to federal questions decided by an American Indian Supreme 
Court.49 Obviously, given the Supreme Court’s appellate and miscellaneous 
dockets,50 it would be unthinkable to extend the certiorari jurisdiction to the 
hundreds of individual tribal court systems, but extending it to a single 
nationwide American Indian Supreme Court would make the expansion 
easily manageable. In this respect, the expansion would be no more 
demanding than that entailed in ILOC’s Roadmap Circuit proposal, which 
similarly would add only a single court to the roster of entities the decisions 
of which would be subject to review by writ of certiorari. To the extent that 
cases were funneled through a single intermediate court, the chances for a 
conflict among the circuits would be slim. The Supreme Court therefore 
would be unlikely to grant many certiorari petitions from an American 
Indian Supreme Court (or, for that matter, from a Roadmap Circuit). 
But is there an objection on the ground that an American Indian Supreme 
Court would exist outside the constitutional framework? Tribes are not 
subject to the Supremacy Clause,51 even though some tribal codes include 
provisions that subject tribal officials to federal law.52 Since Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Fidell, supra note 1, at 26. One consideration that did not occur to me at the time, 
but that is pointed out in a subsequent student article, is that the lack of Supreme Court 
review of tribal court decisions on federal questions (along with other factors) “may make 
some judges reluctant to grant broad tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction.” M. Gatsby Miller, 
Note, The Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Civil 
Cases, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1825, 1841 n.99 (2014) (citing Katherine Florey, Beyond 
Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1557 
(2013)). It is probably impossible to test the hypothesis empirically, as there are not likely to 
be fingerprints in published opinions, but on the face of it, it seems plausible. 
 50. See generally The Supreme Court – The Statistics, 129 HARV. L. REV. 381, 389 
(2015) (Table II) . 
 51. See generally Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian 
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002).  
 52. At one time the Hopi hierarchy of precedential authority surprisingly included 
“Laws, rules and regulations of the Federal Government and cases interpreting such. Such 
laws, rules and regulations may, in circumstances dictated by the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, be required to take a higher order or precedence.” Hopi Tribe Res. No. H-
12-76 § 2(a)(5) (n.d.). The Tribe also provided, 
The Courts of the Hopi Tribe shall not recognize nor apply any federal, state, or 
common law rule or procedure which is inconsistent with either the spirit or the 
letter of either the Hopi Constitution and Bylaws or any Hopi Ordinance or 
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would have to act in order to extend the certiorari jurisdiction,53 an 
American Indian Supreme Court would have a federal imprimatur, even if it 
were in all other respects entirely a product of tribal agreement. 
A pertinent case is Hirota v. MacArthur,54 in which the Supreme Court 
denied leave to file original petitions for writs of habeas corpus with respect 
to convictions rendered by the victorious Allies’ International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, which was not a United States court.55 The 
meaning of Hirota is far from clear,56 but it arguably raises an issue as to 
whether Congress could, without exceeding the outer limits set in Article 
III, authorize the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over 
decisions of an American Indian Supreme Court. One answer is that 
Congress’s “plenary power” over Indian affairs, whatever its source(s),57 
would permeate such a court, even if it were established not by Act of 
Congress but by intertribal agreement. Even if such a court were not 
                                                                                                                 
Resolution or the custom, traditions, or culture of the Hopi Tribe, unless 
otherwise required, in the case of federal law, by the Supremacy Clause of the 
U. S. Constitution. 
Id. § 2(b). Under the 2012 code, however, federal law is not deemed binding. HOPI CODE § 
1.5.4(5) (2012), http://www.tribal-institute.org/download/August2012HopiCode.pdf. Before 
the 2012 codification, federal law, in addition to ranking only fifth in priority, was deemed 
persuasive rather than mandatory, see Hopi Indian Credit Ass’n v. Thomas, 1 Am. Tribal L. 
Rptr. 353 (Hopi App. 1998), reprinted in FLETCHER, TRIBAL LAW, supra note 8, at 101, 
although the Hopi court also acknowledged an exception to the tribal statutory order of 
precedence “when the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause applies.” See FLETCHER, 
TRIBAL LAW, supra note 8, at 104 n.1 (quoting Hopi Indian Credit Ass’n v. Thomas, No. 
AP-001-84, 1996.NAHT.0000007 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1996)); cf. LOWER SIOUX INDIAN 
COMMUNITY IN MINN. CONST. pmbl., http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/minnsiouxcons.html 
(affirming earnest intention to “support, respect and promote the integrity of the Constitution 
of the United States”); CHICKASAW NATION CONST. art. XVII, https://www.chickasaw. 
net/Documents/Long-Term/CN_Consti tuion_Amended2002.aspx (ratified as amended June 
21, 2002) (requiring tribal officials to swear or affirm that they “will support, obey and 
defend the Constitutions of the Chickasaw Nation, and the United States of America”). 
 53. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme 
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and 
under such regulations as the Congress shall make.”). 
 54. 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam). 
 55. Id. at 198. 
 56. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 46, at 272-73 n.4, 1182-83 (discussing Munaf v. 
Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008)). 
 57. See e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Washington v. 
Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1979); 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). See generally DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES 
F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR. & MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 306-13 (6th ed. 2011). 
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deemed sufficiently federal in the abstract,58 once Congress enacted an 
extension of the certiorari jurisdiction to cover it, that in itself would 
arguably invest it with a federal character sufficient to overcome any 
Article III objection. The availability of review of state court decisions by 
the Supreme Court of the United States has long been understood not to 
transform the state courts into federal courts.59 It is far from clear that the 
same would hold true with respect to an American Indian Supreme Court. If 
an extension of the certiorari jurisdiction did have that effect, some might 
well find the price too steep.  
Conclusion 
 The sheer number, persistence and variety of suggestions over the years 
for a nationwide Indian court60 is impressive and suggests that, whatever 
the details (in which of course the Devil lurks), something significant is 
missing from the current architecture of tribal justice across the United 
States. “[A]sking Congress for a complete restructuring of federal Indian 
law is unlikely and is not a practical solution to the issue of tribal 
jurisdiction.”61  
For the reasons explained in Part I, the circuit court urged in the ILOC 
Roadmap is not only politically improbable but unwise,62 and, in any event, 
ILOC’s Roadmap Circuit should not be preferred to the American Indian 
Supreme Court I have suggested. A review of existing federal legislation 
and the work of tribal courts reveals that tribal courts will, with increasing 
frequency, decide questions arising under federal law. Creation of a direct 
appellate route from an American Indian Supreme Court to the Supreme 
Court of the United States would likely be controversial and may run into 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 
U.S. 376 (1896). 
 59. In 1821, the Court ruled in Cohens v. Virginia: 
The American people may certainly give to a national tribunal a supervising 
power over those judgments of the State courts, which may conflict with the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties, of the United States, without converting them 
into federal Courts, or converting the national into a State tribunal. The one 
Court still derives its authority from the State; the other still derives its 
authority from the nation. 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 421-22 (1821).  
 60. Fidell, supra note 1, at 3-11. 
 61. Miller, supra note 49, at 1860 n.203. 
 62. See supra Part I. 
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equally strong headwinds,63 but is within Congress’s power and in principle 
its benefits—both practical and symbolic—would exceed the costs. While 
the ILOC proposal may not be what the doctor ordered, the very fact that a 
congressionally chartered blue-ribbon body thought the time was right for a 
hard look at some basic structural issues is a significant and encouraging 




                                                                                                                 
 63. Cf. Judith Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court 
Decisions, 46 KAN. L. REV. 241, 265 n.165 (1998) (noting that although Supreme Court 
certiorari review of tribal court decisions on federal questions “is far preferable [to de novo 
review in the lower federal courts], neither the Court nor Congress appears likely to adopt 
it”); see also Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction over 
Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the Tribal 
Exhaustion/Abstention Doctrine, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 556 n.126 (1997) (quoting Robert 
Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant and Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian 
Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 415 (1988)). These gloomy, snowball’s-chance-
in-hell predictions were predicated on the notion that, as expanded, the writ of certiorari 
would run to hundreds of tribal courts, which is a far cry from adding a single new court for 
the Supreme Court (with broad discretion over its certiorari docket) to oversee. 
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